{"id":107199,"date":"2024-08-12T16:21:15","date_gmt":"2024-08-12T20:21:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.gpsworld.com\/?p=107199"},"modified":"2024-08-12T16:21:15","modified_gmt":"2024-08-12T20:21:15","slug":"experts-to-pnt-leaders-its-not-working","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.gpsworld.com\/experts-to-pnt-leaders-its-not-working\/","title":{"rendered":"Experts to PNT leaders: \u201cIt’s not working!\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

The President\u2019s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board<\/a> has warned United States leaders that the nation is highly vulnerable to disruption of GPS services. Also, national PNT issues have not received sufficient priority and attention for the last 20 years, and no one is accountable for system performance.<\/p>\n

The warning came in a four-page memo to the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Transportation <\/a>from retired Admiral Thad Allen, Chair of the advisory board. The memo was nominally a report of the board\u2019s April 2024 meeting in Colorado Springs.<\/p>\n

The overwhelming majority of Allen\u2019s message, though, dealt with GPS and U.S. PNT being vulnerable, the importance of PNT to the nation\u2019s safety and security and the failure of the government to do the things it said it should and would do. It says:<\/p>\n

\u201cAmerica\u2019s continued over-reliance on GPS for PNT makes critical infrastructure and applications vulnerable to a variety of well-documented accidental, natural and malicious threats.<\/p>\n

\u2026our conclusion is that PNT, in general, and GPS, in particular, have not been accorded their rightful prominence in the national policy agenda.<\/p>\n

Simply put, the Board believes that the 20-year-old framework for GPS governance and the current policy statements establish neither the priority that the system deserves nor sufficiently clear accountability for its performance.\u201d<\/p>\n

The reason for this was assessed to be that the leadership and governance structure established by 2004\u2019s NSPD-39 and confirmed in 2021\u2019s SPD-7 was not working.<\/p>\n

Allen gave a recent policy document on critical infrastructure as an example. All critical infrastructure sectors use PNT, and most depend on it.<\/p>\n

\u201cThese findings were reinforced just earlier this year by the release of the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22, April 30, 2024). We were surprised to discover that GPS is nowhere mentioned in that important document.\u201d<\/p>\n

While not mentioned in the memo, PNT was also not mentioned in national cybersecurity documents issued last year. This is despite timing being essential to the operation of IT systems, and time and location data being key elements in many applications.<\/p>\n

Allen\u2019s memo also emphasized that the real issue is not about GPS, but overall national PNT capability. He went so far as to say, \u201cSpace Policy Directive 7 (SPD-7), U.S. Space-based PNT Policy, must be revisited and the term \u2018space-based\u2019 should be removed from its title\u201d <\/strong>(emphasis added).<\/p>\n

Reinforcing this message, the following table comparing U.S. and Chinese national PNT systems was included in the memo.<\/p>\n

\"Photo:\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Board believes it is time to take a fresh look at our approach to PNT governance and establish a clear strategy for re-establishing an unquestioned position of leadership for the United States. To be successful, such a strategy requires a governance structure characterized by clearer authority and accountability. Ideally, the administration should propose legislation to Congress that would support this goal with a clear mandate (authorization) and resources (appropriations) adequate to the task.\u201d<\/p>\n

As part of his report of the April meeting, Allen\u2019s memo reaffirmed the board\u2019s nine recommendations from January of last year<\/a> and added three more:<\/p>\n