Photo: Sauce Reques / Royalty-free / iStock / Getty Images Plus

Researchers from the University of Texas at Austin have identified an Israeli air base as a large source of widespread GPS disruptions affecting civilian airline navigation in the Middle East, reported The New York Times. 

The spoofing disruptions involve the transmission of manipulated GPS signals, which can cause airplane instruments to misread their location. Lead researchers Todd Humphreys and Zach Clements stated they are “highly confident” that Ein Shemer Airfield in northern Israel is the source of these attacks. The Israeli military declined The New York Times’ request for comment. 

The research team utilized data emitted by the spoofer and picked up by satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) to determine its location. They then confirmed their calculations using ground data collected in Israel.  

Spoofing, along with GPS jamming, has significantly increased over the past three years, especially near war zones such as Ukraine and Gaza. In these areas, militaries interfere with navigation signals to redirect aerial attacks. 

The Middle East has emerged as a hotspot for GPS spoofing, with The New York Times reporting that a separate analysis estimates more than 50,000 flights have been affected in the region in 2024 alone. Researchers from SkAI Data Services and the Zurich University of Applied Sciences, analyzeding data from the OpenSky Network and, found that these attacks have led pilots to mistakenly believe they were above airports in Beirut or Cairo. 

Swiss International Air Lines told The New York TimesNYT that their flights are spoofed “almost every day over the Middle East.” 

The issue extends beyond the region, with Estonia and other Baltic nations having blamed Russia for disrupting signals in their airspaces. Additionally, in April 2024, Finnair temporarily suspended flights to Tartu, Estonia, amid the rise of GPS jamming in the region affecting civilian air travel.  

The attacks have not led to significant safety risks as pilots can use alternative navigation methods. However, they do raise concerns. 

Jeremy Bennington, vice president of Spirent Communications, told The New York Times, “Losing GPS is not going to cause airplanes to fall out of the sky. But I also don’t want to deny the fact that we are removing layers of safety.” 

The spoofing attacks may cause false alerts about planes being too close to the ground, leading to navigation confusion and possibly compromising flight safety. 

As these disruptions continue to affect large areas far from active conflict zones, the aviation industry and international authorities are under increasing pressure to address this emerging threat to air travel security. 

<p>The post Israeli air base identified as alleged source of GPS disruptions in Mideast first appeared on GPS World.</p>

Figure 1: Scientific observations with GNSS radio occultation (GNSS-RO), GNSS grazing-angle reflectometry (GNSS-GR) and GNSS reflectometry (GNSS-R) techniques from low-Earth orbit (LEO). (Figure provided by the author)

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for peaceful uses are facing a hard reality due to increasing regional conflicts in recent years. As a dual-use technology, GNSS for civil, commercial and scientific applications is vulnerable to both denied/degraded service and flex power operation from GNSS satellites and to jamming from the ground.

One of the vulnerable scientific applications is the use of GNSS receivers on low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites that utilize the civil navigation signals for Earth observation. These remote sensing techniques, such as GNSS radio occultation (GNSS-RO), GNSS grazing-angle reflectometry (GNSS-GR) and GNSS reflectometry (GNSS-R) (see figure 1), are designed to observe weak GNSS signals either bounced off from Earth’s surface or refracted by the atmosphere. Thus, GNSS flex power operation and intentional radio frequency interference (RFI) can severely degrade the quality of the scientific data or even prevent Earth observation.

One example of such impacts is a dramatic decrease of GNSS-RO observations over Europe and the Middle East during 2023. Monthly statistics from Spire show the region without GPS-RO measurements grew substantially from the localized Ukraine-Russia conflict zone in January to a much wider area in Eastern Europe and the Middle East in December 2023 (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Number density distribution of monthly GNSS-RO measurements from the GPS tracking by the Spire constellation over Europe and the Middle East in 2023. The black area indicates no data. (Figure provided by the author)

This vast data void in the science observation is likely a result of the intensified electronic warfare used in Ukraine-Russia and the nearby conflict regions. The Spire RO receivers are configured to track the civil signals from GPS, GLONASS and Galileo. To increase signal protection against jamming in a conflict zone, GNSS service providers often use flex power operation. However, flex power operations can cause poor quality tracking with the RO receiver due to weaker signal power. Unlike a precise orbit determination (POD) antenna, the GNSS-RO antennas typically have a high gain to improve the detection of weak GNSS signals at limb and occulted views. However, if the transmitter power of civil signals drops below a quality-control (QC) threshold, the data are flagged as bad. This results in a poor coverage of Spire GNSS-RO in the conflict zones.

Lost or degraded GNSS-RO, GNSS-R and GNSS-GR observations are unfortunate, as these all-weather sensing, long-term stability, and high-accuracy measurements are becoming increasingly important in scientific research. GNSS-RO is a remote sensing technique that uses the GNSS-LEO link to profile Earth’s atmosphere and ionosphere with high vertical resolution. Since the first GNSS-RO six-satellite constellation, known as Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate-1 (COSMIC-1), these high-quality RO profiles have become a key data source for weather forecasting, climate monitoring, model evaluation, and space weather research. The current backbone of GNSS-RO observations comes from the COSMIIC-2 and Spire constellations, which have been producing more than 20,000 profiles per day since 2020. GNSS-R is a bi-static radar technique that uses the GNSS signals reflected by the surface for altimetry, ocean surface wind speed, wave height sea ice, soil moisture, and inundation measurements. At a view angle between GNSS-RO and GNSS-R, GNSS-GR can provide complementary measurements for sea ice and atmospheric column water vapor. Because of low-cost LEO SmallSat/CubeSat constellations with the GNSS receivers, geoscience studies have benefited greatly from the sampling density and coverage of these new data.

Civilization and science have been diverted by wars before. Despite the increased dependence on GNSS in recent years, their vulnerability to jamming and flex power operation poses a great challenge for scientific observations that need uniform global coverage.

<p>The post Research Report: A Black Hole in Earth science first appeared on GPS World.</p>

NASA’s Ingenuity took this picture on Jan. 18, 2024. The sand-dune, rock-less area where Ingenuity last
showing the shadow of its damaged rotor blade. (Image: NASA)

It appears that the little extraterrestrial drone that could has come a cropper on Mars and now will not be flying again – it is permanently grounded. The Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) crew managing Ingenuity was running a regular scouting trip over a featureless sand-dune area on Dec. 22, 2023. Suddenly, the UAV’s visual navigation system malfunctioned, which led to a hard emergency landing.

When the autonomous navigation system did not have any landmarks to match its digital reference map, it reverted to an emergency landing. Maybe the poor guy should have had a few moments to gather its airborne wits and to come down softly, but alas at the same time the connection with the rover was lost, he dove for cover and broke a chunk off at least one of the counter-rotating blades. This now apparently prevents further take-offs. Mars’ atmosphere is only 1% as dense as Earth’s, so those rotors need all their designed lift capabilities to grab enough ‘air’ and get the 4 lb helicopter airborne. The flight control system may be unable to cope with the resulting compromised lift profile. Either way Ingenuity’s flying days are over, according to NASA.

Conceptual design for the Sample Recovery Helicopters
(Image: Aerovironment/ NASA/ JPL)

Ingenuity completed 72 flights over the course of three years, surpassing its original 30-day mission to prove the possibility of a miniature, autonomous helicopter flight on Mars. After its initial four flights, NASA and JPL chose the UAV to scout out safe paths for the Perseverance rover from an airborne perspective.

All is not lost for Ingenuity, however. AeroVironment, the UAV manufacturer that co-developed Ingenuity with NASA/JPL, has been awarded another contract to design and develop two prototype ‘sample-return’ helicopters for NASA’s next major Mars expedition.

Building on Ingenuity’s design, the new UAV will have wheels and a grappling contraption to pick up sample tubes, which could assist in the Mars sample recovery mission. Perseverance is currently expected to be the lead in transferring cached sample tubes to the new Sample Retrieval Lander for return to Earth, but the new helicopters provide a different backup option on Mars for pick-up and transport of the tubes.

Back here on Earth, the latest tragic news from the Middle East — the UAV attack on the US Tower 22 military outpost in Jordan which cost three soldiers their lives and injured at least 34 others — appears to have been due to a lack of defensive capability. Earlier news releases indicated that the kamikaze UAV had arrived at the same time as the expected return of a U.S. UAV from the base, implying that defenses may have been taken down temporarily. It now seems that there was little active defense to prevent the attack.

The attacking UAV reportedly came in very low, and the base was unable to track its approach. The base is said to have defensive signal jamming capabilities, but without radar visibility of the UAV and knowing an attack was in progress, the jammers may have been ineffective or inactive.

Tower 22 was thought of as a low-risk-of-attack U.S. base, perhaps supporting another U.S. base in Syria with logistics, so no active drone suppression system had been provisioned. This assessment, and those for similar bases in the area and around the world, may perhaps have to be revised and sufficient active defenses may need to be installed.

While U.S. and Ukrainian forces deal with attacking drones, Iran has unveiled its latest addition to its arsenal of one-way killer unmanned aircraft.

Image: Iranian Military Media

Iran displayed the Shahed-238 in public in November 2023, so there may have already been enough time to get some of these very fast-flying vehicles through the manufacturing process and begin deliveries to Russia and Iranian proxy agents. The advantage of jet-power is of course significant speed over propeller-driven variants, while the range may be significantly less for the same fuel capacity. The disadvantage for the United States and Ukraine is that most fielded conventional UAV detection radars have difficulty seeing fast targets in time to activate and aim defensive weapons.

The situation for Ukraine and the United States in the Middle East appears to be worsening as large numbers of Iranian-supplied and locally manufactured kamikaze UAVs are pumped into the war zone and ‘hot spots’ in the Middle East.

It is sad that Mars aerial views may be limited as Ingenuity seems to be permanently grounded, and the Middle East doesn’t sound too safe to be hanging around in either! Further escalation of prices might be expected, too, as a good part of the volume of cargo ships settle into sailing around Africa. Let’s look for better news in the coming months.

<p>The post Final grounding for Ingenuity? first appeared on GPS World.</p>

For many, these clues conjured up images of bombs falling to Earth from space, satellites destroyed by powerful electromagnetic pulses, shrapnel impacting the space station, and so on.

Yet, putting nuclear weapons in space would be a clear violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to which Russia and the United States are both signatories. It would also significantly increase East-West tensions at a time when Russia has enough tension and international condemnation to handle.

Thursday evening the White House calmed the waters a bit by saying that Russia was pursing an anti-satellite weapon that cannot cause physical destruction on Earth.

The most reasonable conclusion to draw from all of this is that Russia is closing in on its goal of having a nuclear-powered electronic warfare capability in space.

Such a reusable weapon could be far more useful than any one-use nuclear explosive device.

Threat = Intent + Capability

A lengthy and detailed 2019 article on the site “Space Review” examined indications that Russia had begun construction of such a device. Titled “Ekipazh: Russia’s top-secret nuclear-powered satellite” it begins:

“There is strong evidence from publicly available sources that a Russian company called KB Arsenal is working on a new type of military satellite equipped with a nuclear power source. Called Ekipazh, its mission may well be to perform electronic warfare [EW] from space.”

The author, Bart Hendrickx, goes on to explain that development of such a weapon would be entirely in keeping with reported Russian government plans. Citing one Russian language source he says:

“… the deployment of EW platforms in orbit would be in accordance with a policy for Russia’s electronic warfare program until 2020 approved by the Russian government in January 2012. A summary of this policy indeed mentions space-based electronic warfare as one of the objectives to be accomplished in the period before 2025. More specifically, it talks about the need to deploy ‘multifunctional space-based EW complexes for reconnaissance and suppression of radio-electronic systems used by radar, navigation and communications systems.’”

When intelligence agencies assess the severity of a particular threat, they look at an adversary’s desire or intent to carry out a particular act, and their capability to do so. If the reporting is correct, Russia has intended to put a nuclear-powered EW satellite or spacecraft in orbit for some time. This week’s political dust up may mean that the decades of hard work described by Hendrickx in Space Review have paid off and given them the ability to do so.

More Useful Than Orbiting Bombs

The United States is far more dependent upon space than any other nation. As regular GPS World readers know, this is especially true for the essential positioning, navigation, and timing services that underpin virtually every technology.

Destroying satellites would quickly lead to a shooting war that no one would want.

On the other hand, electronic warfare doesn’t necessarily lead to casualties right away and is harder to recognize as actual warfare. For example, Russia has been attacking NATO countries, ships, and aircraft in the Baltic with GPS jamming and spoofing on and off since mid-December. No one has died (yet) and NATO, to the best of our knowledge, has not responded.

Rather than destroying satellites, how much more useful is it to be able to temporarily disrupt the operation of one or more satellites? Or perhaps one type of satellite, such as GPS?

Such attacks are reversable, so the attacked party is less likely to send bombs and bullets in return right away. And if the attacker gets what they want, or suddenly discovers they have gone a bit too far and are approaching a kinetic exchange, backing off is as easy as flipping a switch.

Just the threat of being able to deny GPS or other satellite signals over a wide area would be useful.

In fact, Russia has already made this kind of threat and it didn’t backfire.

In November 2021, prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia used a ground-based missile to destroy one of its own defunct satellites. Shortly thereafter Russian state-sponsored media claimed the demonstration “… means that if NATO crosses our red line, it risks losing all 32 of its GPS satellites at once.” Aside from a strong diplomatic tongue-lashing, there were few consequences. Additionally, wherever the “red line” was, it seems that NATO did not cross it.

Nuclear Powered EW Most Likely

It’s hard to know what more will be revealed, if anything, about this week’s dust-up over Russia, weapons, space, and nuclear.

But Russia has long prided itself on its electronic warfare prowess. It sees EW as a counterbalance to the West’s dominance in high tech weapons and warfare.

It is highly likely that Russia is executing its plans to extend this prowess and advantage into space with a nuclear-powered EW satellite.

Whether or not this is the root Washington’s kerfuffle, the possibility should be an on-going concern for the United States.

Our dependance on space makes us vulnerable. Our critical over-dependence on space for PNT, especially in light of the terrestrial PNT alternatives available to Russia and China, exposes our jugular and virtually invites attack.

We have placed most of our eggs in the same basket — and there are too many ways in which it can be knocked to the ground.

Until the United States establishes a resilient national PNT architecture, one with GPS at its center supported by other diverse and robust sources, we will continue to unintentionally encourage such things as space-based nuclear-powered electronic warfare and be at severe risk.

<p>The post Russia’s space-based nuclear weapon? Here’s an educated guess first appeared on GPS World.</p>

3D-printed drone seized by anti-terror officers and rear access panel (Image: West Midlands CTU/PA)

The experts who analyzed the vehicle stated that it was only partially built and appeared somewhat ‘primitive’ in its construction. It would seem that an explosive charge or chemical weapon would need to be located with its fusing circuitry at the front end of the UAV, and maybe the enclosure was rather an access panel to aid the build process.

It is unclear whether the protruding black item towards the front of the UAV is either a GNSS or communications antenna. This antenna would normally be placed on the upper skin and relatively close to the autopilot or comms radio. It is possible that there is a communications/control signal antenna at the top of the vertical stabilizer. Rudimentary landing gear can be seen aft of the control surfaces of the wing, but the rear propulsion does not appear adequate for the size of the vehicle. Not a bad attempt to create an amateur UAV, but a pretty bad idea for the guy involved to intend it to be a kamikaze, one-way drone for ISIS — he received a 20-year sentence.

Both Russia and Ukraine continue to churn out new models of one-way UAVs, which they enthusiastically hurl at one another. Russia unveiled a new swarm drone known as ‘Product 53’ which apparently has the ability to seek and identify targets autonomously.

With a payload of only 3-5 kg it cannot inflict severe damage on major targets, but the plan is apparently to bombard an area with large numbers of Product 53 controlled as a swarm.

So, Russia’s latest software-driven, sophisticated kamikaze UAV is a far cry from the primitive, partially constructed, 3D-printed UAV which lead a UK court to jail its constructor. Much more was obviously made of his encrypted online contacts with ISIS and his intent to inflict potential death and destruction on behalf of a terrorist group.

On a far brighter note, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project known as Control of Revolutionary Aircraft with Novel Effectors (CRANE), which first went out to industry for proposals back in 2021, has now moved into Phase 3 build and manufacture following a successful Phase 2 Critical Design Review (CDR).

Aurora Flight Sciences, a Boeing Company subsidiary, has been authorized to begin building a 7000 lb X-wing manned/unmanned aircraft. The aircraft is intended to prove out a design for aerodynamic control without the use of moving surfaces.

Illustration of proposed X-Wing aircraft (Image: DARPA)

Elevators, flaps, slats and rudders on conventional modern aircraft require significant internal hydraulics and/or cabling and actuators throughout the airframe, which add to the complexity, and potential failure modes, aerodynamic drag and weight. Most current UAVs emulate these flight control systems and use external control surfaces.

The DARPA X-Wing aircraft may use compressed air jets or even electrical discharges emitted at critical actuation points along its outer surface to ‘gently push’ the aircraft from its existing path through the airstream, which allows the remote pilot to maneuver the aircraft. Known as Active Flow Control (AFC) this technology has been prototyped to one extent or another in recent years, but this DARPA/Aurora project aims to prove the concept.

For the demonstration aircraft, normal moving control surfaces will be installed and retained. The aircraft will initially be flown using these standard airflow controls to form a baseline for how the aircraft performs. The control surfaces will then be locked down and the aircraft will be flown using AFC, and the performance will be compared to the standard controls baseline.

Understandably, the earlier phases of the project likely worked through the required control systems for the unique X-wing configuration. Aurora may have been well positioned to provide such flight control systems, autopilot and software from its store of Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) technology — the basis for the operation of autonomous air vehicles.

Building illicit UAVs intended for terrorism may not be one of the best academic projects to undertake when you’re an ISIS supporter; Russia and Ukraine appear to be in a race to mass produce ever more sophisticated UAVs; and DARPA/Aurora appear to be headed to a relatively heavy prototype air vehicle demonstrating not only X-Wing technology, but also active flight control. Overall, there is a variety of news on UAVs in various configurations and applications.

<p>The post Kamikazi UAVs and X-Wings first appeared on GPS World.</p>

Airbus EchoPulse demo aircraft. (Photo: Airbus/EchoPulse)

The team working with Airbus includes Daher, which has modified its TBM 900 turboprop aircraft to add the electrical system, motors and props supplied by Safran. Airbus has developed the 800-volt battery and the Flight Control System for the aircraft, through which any future autonomous capability would likely be brought about.

The decision to try this ‘hybrid’ approach may have been influenced by Volvo, which is pressing this approach for the Series 90 and 60 of its hybrid Electric Vehicles (EV). Combining recharging by an internal combustion engine with a battery and electric drive system greatly extends the range of this model, greatly reduces its gas consumption, and minimizes the hunt for rare recharging outlets.

It would seem that the principal benefit from the Airbus team development could be the 800-volt DC battery design, and the high voltage distribution/control/recharging system when they are potentially spun off and applied to other manned/unmanned eVTOL passenger aircraft. The basic problem for eVTOL aircraft is payload and range – is that something that a huge energy reservoir such as this battery system could support?

Airbus EchoPulse demo aircraft. (Photo: Airbus/EchoPulse)

Developed by Airbus Defense and Space in Toulouse, France, the 800-volt DC battery system delivers up to 350 kilowatts to the electric system on the aircraft. The battery was derived from earlier versions that were flown on Airbus CityBus eVTOL demonstrator and FlightLab helicopters. The Lithium-ion battery weighs in at 350 kg (772 lbs.) and is mounted in an enclosure of the belly of the EcoPulse demonstration aircraft.

Airbus reportedly plans on taking this high energy-density battery into its commercial aircraft business. But the main market could be for hybrid eVTOL aircraft, which can carry this heavy battery and its control system and to benefit from the massive energy density.

Meanwhile, as the Russian-Ukrainian war drags on with both sides throwing at each other increasing numbers of ‘kamikaze’ UAVs carrying explosives, interest has recently been growing around a 2020 report out of St. Petersburg Electro-technical University in Russia that critiques the Russian air defense system. According to the report, these defenses are poorly adapted to detect or destroy vehicles as small and slow-moving as UAVs.

Ukrainian UAV troops were only recently pictured assembling weaponized drones for their one-way trip to Russian-owned targets.

Photo released by General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Telegram

The explosive carriers are frequently simple racing UAVs. In one released photo, an inexpensive quadcopter is taped together with plastic explosives and an RPG warhead using adhesive tape. Nothing has to be very durable, just durable enough to last for its short one-way trip through Russian defenses.

The Russian air defenses rely on several tracked and/or wheeled mobile systems using both guns and missiles. This includes radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles, such as the Pantsir-S1, the Tunguska, the Tor, the Strela-10, and the Igla-S man-portable missiles, all of which are designed to combat high-speed jet aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles. At the same time, UAVs are slow and very small in comparison.

Unfortunately, the missiles ‘ poor target detection capability and detonation control systems appear to be the culprits for the inability to strike down UAVs. Tor radar has been seen to only detect at 3-4km (1.8 -2.5 miles), while the minimum operating range is about the same. Thus, misses are reportedly more likely than taking out attacking drones. While the system may be somewhat ineffective, the cost of using missiles is huge.

A Ukrainian UAV recording within close range of a Russian Tor defense system has captured video of a missile hurtling past and failing to bring it down. Similar results have been found with both the Pantsir-S1 and Tunguska defense systems.

For the close-in gun and cannon defense systems, Russian tests demonstrated that to raise the probability of a direct hit to just 50% for an attacking drone at a distance of 1.3 miles, between four to 13 thousand shells would need to be fired.  This is significantly more ammunition than one Tor system can fire in one volley without reloading, even at 5,000 rounds/minute of which it is capable.

Ukrainian war strategists continue to acquire thousands of UAVs each month, while its troops continue to throw them against their Russian invaders with improvised explosive payloads. Meanwhile, as of December 2023, Congress is continuing negotiations over another $61.4 billion in funding to further Ukraine’s war efforts, even while President Zelenskyy visited Washington to urge the U.S. to maintain its support.

The problem with this situation is that both sides have learned that UAV warfare’ is simpler, less dangerous for the aggressor, and less costly than regular offensives. Thus, a stalemate might prolong the war for even longer.

So, on the commercial, peaceful side of drone development, the possibility of a hybrid-electric approach for eVTOL passenger-carrying autonomous vehicles is making progress. Nevertheless, as the war continues in Ukraine, could the reduced cost of UAV warfare’ possibly prolong it?

<p>The post More about eVTOLs first appeared on GPS World.</p>

Image: Maritime Robotics

Maritime Robotics, a Norwegian provider of autonomous technology, and Teledyne Marine have delivered several unmanned surface vessels (USVs) to Ukraine’s Navy for advanced sensor data collection. 

Maritime Robotics’ Otter USV, equipped with the Teledyne RESON SeaBAT T51-R multibeam echosounder, is now being used by Ukraine’s Navy. The USV is designed for critical data collection without endangering human lives, as the sensors are carried by an unmanned vehicle. The data and information collected by the USV aims to strengthen Ukraine’s defense, enhance maritime traffic security and support the safety of civilians in the areas. 

Otter USV is part of Maritime Robotics’ portfolio of autonomous technologies capable of supporting military personnel in mapping and securing marine environments. Controlled and navigated remotely, Maritime Robotics’ USVs are designed to identify, locate and safely neutralize potential threats such as explosive devices and sea mines.  

<p>The post Maritime Robotics, Teledyne Marine deliver USVs to Ukraine first appeared on GPS World.</p>

Image: guvendemir/ E+/Getty Images

Electronic warfare in the Middle East and Ukraine is affecting air travel far beyond the battlefields, unnerving pilots and revealing unintended consequences of a tactic that experts believe will become more widespread, reported The New York Times.  

Planes are losing satellite signals, flights have been diverted and pilots have received false location reports or inaccurate warnings that they were flying close to terrain, according to European Union safety regulators and an internal airline memo viewed by The New York Times. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also warned pilots about GPS jamming in the Middle East. 

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, radio frequency interference only continues to increase across the Middle East as of autumn 2023. These interferences can involve jamming GNSS signals to obstruct or block them using noise, or mimicking signals to trick GNSS receivers into picking up counterfeit satellite signals, known as spoofing.  

Aircraft systems have been unable to detect GPS spoofing and ultimately correct for it. According to Opsgroup, an organization that monitors changes and risks in the aviation industry, one Embraer jet bound for Dubai nearly veered into Iranian airspace in September before the pilots figured out the plane was chasing a false signal. 

“We only realized there was an issue because the autopilot started turning to the left and right, so it was obvious that something was wrong,” crew members reported to Opsgroup. 

Issues arise 

With the rise of electronic warfare, the strain on aviation could be a sign of more serious economic and security issues.  

The U.S. government calls GNSS signals “an invisible utility.” Smartphones, cars, stock exchanges, data centers and countless industries rely on them for time, navigation or both. Similar systems exist around the world, such as Galileo in Europe, Glonass in Russia, QZSS in Japan, NavIC in India and BeiDou in China. One study from Britain said a five-day disruption of satellite signals could cost the country $6.3 billion. 

Minor interference with GPS signals is fairly common. GPS jamming devices, while illegal to use, are inexpensive and easy to obtain from vendors on the internet. Governments, too, have been more willing to overtly interfere with signals as a tactic in electronic warfare. 

It is not always possible to distinguish jamming from spoofing, or to determine who is behind the interference. Israel said in mid-October it had restricted GPS in the region and had warned pilots not to rely on satellite navigation systems for landing.  

Russian interference is well-documented. A 2019 report by the Washington-based analytical nonprofit group C4ADS showed extensive spoofing from a Russian-controlled air base in Syria. Reports also indicated that, when Russian President, Vladimir Putin, traveled to remote locations or Russian-occupied Crimea, he was flanked by mobile GPS-spoofing technology. 

Russia has disrupted GPS signals to misdirect Ukrainian UAVs and throw precision-guided shells off their targets. Ukraine also jams Russian receivers but lacks the same level of sophistication.  

Jamming is common in conflict zones. Spoofing, until recently, was considered rare.   

The interference has been felt up to 190 miles away from battlefields and “appears to go well beyond simple military mission effectiveness,” according to Eurocontrol, Europe’s primary air-traffic-control manager. The worst-affected regions include the aerial space above the Black Sea area from Turkey to Azerbaijan; the Mediterranean Sea extending from Cyprus to Libya; the Baltic Sea near Poland and Latvia; and the Arctic near Finland and Norway. 

Airbus said it recorded nearly 50,000 interference events on its aircraft last year, more than four times as many as the year before. This came on top of an over twentyfold jump in radio-interference events from 2017 to 2018, as recorded by a voluntary incident reporting system run by Eurocontrol. Eurocontrol said the increased jamming since 2018 was most likely meant to interfere with battlefield UAVs. 

In the Middle East, there have been reports of false signals telling pilots their aircraft were directly above the airport in Tel Aviv despite being far away. Opsgroup said it had received around 50 similar reports. In some cases, onboard equipment showed that planes were approaching airports in Baghdad, Cairo or Beirut, Lebanon, when they were not. 

Looking ahead 

Spoofing is hard to distinguish because the signal appears legitimate. Only Europe’s Galileo incorporates an authentication system that can verify when a signal is from its satellites. Galileo, which currently is the most accurate and precise navigation satellite system, plans to introduce an even stronger level of authentication, according to the European Commission. 

But even Galileo’s authentication cannot protect against one of the most dreaded types of spoofing, known as “meaconing.” In a meaconing attack, a spoofer would record satellite signals, and then rebroadcast them with an amplification or a delay. Experts have not publicly confirmed any meaconing attacks in the Middle East. 

Opsgroup said the latest events should prompt manufacturers to re-examine the integration of satellite signals in aircraft electronics, known as avionics, without a safeguard that can identify false signals.

In this environment of intentional GPS jamming and spoofing, Israel has produced a leading anti-jam technology company, InfiniDome, located in Caesarea. According to co-founder Omer Sharar, the company has been working to defend GPS signals for more than seven years and has also seen the rise of devices to jam the GPS L1 frequency that anyone can buy online for $100.   

Gpsdome-1 (left) protects GPS L1. GPSdome-2 (right) protects GPS L1/L2 or GPS L1/GLONASS L1. (Image: InfiniDome)

Most readily available jammer electronics only output interference disrupting GPS L1, which is commonly installed for vehicle tracking and UAV guidance. InfiniDome says it has successfully protected trucking, UAV operations and others in Israel and around the world with its Infinidome GPSdome-1 and GPSdome-2 anti-jam products. 

It is clear the conflict’s repercussions extend well beyond the battlefield, highlighting the critical need for security assessments or alternative PNT systems to protect civilians. While there is going to be a significant impact on commercial airline travel to and from Israel while hostilities continue, there is hope for a possible long-term solution for the intense jamming that has plagued the region for years.  

<p>The post Beyond the frontlines: The far-reaching effects of electronic warfare first appeared on GPS World.</p>